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SyMPOSIuM
From Habits to Self-regulation: How do We
change?
Carol A. Gianessi
Interdepartmental Neuroscience Program, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut
The yale Cognitive Science department hosted the conference “From Habits to Self-Regu-
lation: How Do We Change?” on November 4 and 5, 2011, to showcase current research
on self-control in cognitive science, psychology, and neuroscience. The conference included
a panel discussion by four philosophers who gave context for the scope and limitations of
research on self-control. The common theme concerning the best method to attain lasting
change included becoming aware of what one wants to change, increasing commitment to
the goal of change, and imagining all of the potential problems and solutions to those prob-
lems.
IntroductIon
How do we change? This is an essen-
tial question for individuals who may have
gotten into bad habits such as overeating,
not getting enough exercise, addiction, and
depression, all of which could potentially
be  changed  through  self-control.  Yale’s
Tamar Gendler (Cognitive Science Chair
and Philosophy) and Hedy Kober (Psychi-
atry)  organized  the  conference  “From
Habits to Self-Regulation: How Do We
Change?” at Yale University on November
4 and 5, 2011. Twenty-two professors from
diverse  institutions  and  affiliations  dis-
cussed current research into why and how
we control ourselves.
Self-control is defined as acting in a
manner consistent with global goals and
values in the face of smaller, proximal re-
wards when these are in conflict [1]. A di-
eter faced with a cupcake is one example
of a good situation to exercise self-control.
The conference featured research on a va-
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riety of topics related to self-control, in-
cluding delay discounting, psychiatric dis-
orders,  dieting,  drug  addiction,  and
schoolwork. Dialog was encouraged across
disciplines, and the conference featured a
panel  of  philosophers  including  Tamar
Gendler, Hedy Kober and Matthew Noah
Smith from Yale, Rae Langton from MIT,
and J. David Velleman from New York Uni-
versity,  who  discussed  the  philosophical
context for research on self control. This re-
port summarizes the opinions and findings
of the following speakers: Walter Mischel
from  Columbia;  Daeyeol  Lee  and  Susan
Nolen-Hoeksema  from  Yale;  Richard
Holton from MIT;  Angela Duckworth from
the University of Pennsylvania; and Kentaro
Fujita from Ohio State University.
delay dIScountIng
Walter Mischel from Columbia Univer-
sity was the keynote speaker because his fa-
mous  marshmallow  experiment  is  the
keystone of the entire field. In this experi-
ment, 4-year-old children were given the op-
tion to eat one marshmallow right away or
wait 15 minutes for two marshmallows. The
children who were able to wait for the two
marshmallows had significantly higher SAT
scores 10 years later [2]. Mischel’s research
characterized the power of the situation and
the ability of an individual to change its im-
pact on his or her behavior. Imagining a pic-
ture frame around the marshmallow enabled
one child to wait for the two marshmallows,
because “you can’t eat a picture!” [2]. Dis-
covering effective cognitive strategies like
this is the goal of research on self-control.
How can we self-regulate to optimize life
success? 
This marshmallow experiment finding
generalizes  to  other  rewards,  including
money. Economic theory predicts rational
agents who would always prefer $100 in 1
week rather than $10 right now, though ex-
perimental  psychology  evidence  suggests
that humans tend to choose concrete imme-
diate rewards over abstract remote ones [1].
Neuroeconomics studies this type of decision
by modeling delay discounting, the recalcu-
lation of value based on the expected length
of delay and the expected size of reward in
order to directly compare the outcomes. For
example, perhaps two marshmallows in 15
minutes is subjectively equivalent to half a
marshmallow right now, so the choice is
made to take the immediate single marsh-
mallow.
Neuroeconomics theorizes that there is a
dual process to decision-making: model-free
versus  model-based  learning  algorithms.
Model-free refers to habits, well-practiced re-
flexive patterns that do not require attention,
like tying your shoe or driving your automatic
route home. Model-based means decision-
making directed at a goal that reflects on the
value of action outcomes, like playing a strat-
egy  game.  This  terminology  stems  from
thinking about how the brain is like a com-
puter, where a model approximates how the
world works and then is refined through com-
parisons to experience. Model-free decision
processes involve simpler computations and
are optimal under situations of certainty. Daw
and colleagues in their 2005 theoretical paper
[3] have postulated that these dual processes
are  anatomically  localized  in  the  human
brain, model-free to the striatum and model-
based to the prefrontal cortex, which compete
for control of behavioral responses. Prefrontal
cortex has largely expanded in primates and
is commonly thought to be involved in exec-
utive functions like planning, verbal reason-
ing, and problem solving. The striatum is an
evolutionarily conserved brain structure that
is  commonly  associated  with  controlling
complex motor patterns. Self-control aimed
at changing a bad habit would utilize goal-di-
rected or model-based learning algorithms
and prefrontal cortex in this theoretical frame-
work. 
Experiments in neuroeconomics use
the intertemporal choice task, where delay
discounted values of options are estimated
by varying the size of reward and length of
the wait, and measuring brain activity re-
lated to decision-making. Daeyeol Lee of
the Interdepartmental Neuroscience Pro-
gram at Yale presented his research on the
neural  basis  of  delay  discounting  using
electrophysiological recordings of individ-Gianessi: Neuroscience of self-control 295
ual neurons in monkeys. Electrical activity
of neurons in lateral prefrontal cortex neu-
rons and in the caudate nucleus of the stria-
tum  reflects  the  calculation  of  the
difference between discounted values of
outcomes [4,5]. Lee argues that since the
time course of this information is the same
in the striatum and the prefrontal cortex
that these structures do not compete, but
rather function as an iterative loop during
decision-making. Further studies charac-
terizing  individual  differences  in  the
propensity to wait and what neural corre-
lates exist for shifting between strategies in
decision-making are forthcoming. 
Lee has found that choice behavior in
delay discounting is best modeled by a hy-
perbolic function [4]. An individual with
strong self-control would prefer the delayed
larger reward across more situations, and
their  discounting  function  would  conse-
quently approach a flat line. Individuals
with  addiction,  bipolar  disorder,  schizo-
phrenia, or attention deficit hyperactivity
disorder all share steeper discounting func-
tions, shifted the opposite direction toward
preferring the immediate smaller reward
[6,7]. Delay discounting is one experimen-
tal technique used to discover rational ther-
apies for these disorders.
A variation of the standard intertem-
poral choice paradigm introduces risk into
the decision by adding uncertainty as to
whether the delayed large reward would be
awarded. Adding risk to the delayed reward
increases the use of model-free learning al-
gorithms and consequently pushes the dis-
counting  function  toward  preferring  the
smaller immediate certain reward over the
larger later uncertain reward [4]. This tech-
nique was used to show the efficacy of
guanfacine (trade name Intuniv), a drug
used to treat attention deficit hyperactivity
disorder [8]. Guanfacine is an agonist of
the alpha-2A subtype of the norepinephrine
receptor, a rational treatment based on cur-
rent theory of the molecular basis of work-
ing  memory  [9].  Acute  treatment  with
guanfacine shifts delay discounting func-
tion toward preference for the larger later
reward in the standard procedure, but does
not change preference for risk in the uncer-
tain version of the task [8]. Therapeutic
guanfacine use can thus be expected to in-
crease patience without increasing impul-
sive risk taking. 
PSycHIatrIc dISorderS
Many psychiatric disorders also result
from aberrant self-regulation, and rational
therapies  can  harness  self-control  mecha-
nisms. Susan Nolen-Hoekesema, Chair of
Yale’s Psychology Department, presented her
research on rumination, the cognitive basis
for depression and anxiety. Depression and
anxiety disorders are accompanied and per-
petuated by rumination, the passive focus on
one’s  symptoms  of  distress,  and  possible
causes and consequences of these symptoms
[10]. In this case, thinking about the abstract
long-term future is harmful, and finding new
strategies to engage problem solving may be
therapeutic. Therapy often points out the ha-
bitual pattern of negative thoughts that have
become ingrained worries. Strategies to en-
hance awareness of rumination have been
shown to improve mood, particularly mind-
fulness meditation [11]. Mindfulness medita-
tion is a practice of making non-judgmental
observation of present moment experiences,
including sensations, feelings, and thoughts.
This practice is thought to work by making
an individual aware of when he or she is en-
gaging in rumination and then can use various
strategies  like  journaling  or  jogging  to
process emotion or distract from the prob-
lematic habitual thought patterns. Mindful-
ness meditation has diverse implications for
medicine, ranging from treatment of chronic
pain to recovering from obesity to improving
doctor-patient dialogue [12]. Mindfulness is
one practice to enhance awareness that can
improve self-control. 
dIetIng
Dieting is one example of self-control,
where one must behave in accordance with
the abstract long-term goal of losing weight
over the immediate reward of a chocolate
cupcake. Interestingly, meta-analysis of dataGianessi: Neuroscience of self-control 296
collected using self-report measures of self-
control shows only small effect sizes for
self-control leading to diet success [13]. This
meta-analysis also shows that trait self-con-
trol has a greater influence on automatic
rather than controlled behaviors, suggesting
that self-control helps form good habits [13].
Successful weight loss is expected when an
individual fosters long-term changes of eat-
ing habits.
Cognitive neuroscientists use functional
magnetic  resonance  imaging  to  measure
changes in blood flow, or the blood oxy-
genation level dependent (BOLD†) contrast,
as a proxy for neural activity, based on the
assumption that increased activity in a re-
gion’s neurons related to a given task will
require more oxygen. Cognitive regulation
of craving high calorie foods is associated
with decreases in striatum and increases in
prefrontal cortex BOLD signal [14]. Re-
duced craving is achieved by focusing on the
long-term deleterious effects of consuming
the cupcake, which brings conscious aware-
ness to the importance of the long-term goal
of dieting [14]. Focusing awareness on what
one wants to change and on how to solve
problems is a helpful strategy to encourage
development of good habits. 
drug addIctIon
Drug addiction is viewed as self-control
failure by the economics model of the indi-
vidual making decisions based on reason.
Richard Holton, a philosopher from MIT,
discussed the role of self-control in addic-
tion in relation to the law. Rational individ-
uals ought to be held responsible for their
actions under just laws. Punitive laws for
use of illegal drugs should follow if a user
willfully engages in drug taking. If, how-
ever, drug taking has become a compulsive
habit that an addict has lost the ability to
control using reason, how responsible for
drug use can law hold the addict? Illegal
drugs are sampled by many in the popula-
tion by their mid 30s, but most people stop
use when incentives shift to maintain em-
ployment or a relationship with a spouse,
implying a rational decision strategy [15].
Addiction in a rational individual would re-
sult  from  withdrawal,  the  negative  rein-
forcement  of  consequences  of  stopping,
which continues the drug use. However, the
chance of relapse after withdrawal is very
high, so the high cost of withdrawal cannot
be reinforcing drug use [16]. It is not rational
to immediately return to drug use when one
has just felt the worst of the negative conse-
quences of that behavior.
The incentive salience model of drug
addiction posits that there are independent
representations of liking and wanting in the
brain, and that addiction is wanting without
liking [16]. When one becomes addicted, the
drug  increases  in  saliency  as  a  reward,
which drives drug seeking beyond the hedo-
nic  value  enjoyed.  A  rational  individual
would make choices based on liking some-
thing, seeking drugs based on their hedonic
properties alone. Drug seeking persists in
spite of the absence of enjoyment, like when
the drug is not given and also persists in the
face of losing jobs, family, and friends, de-
spite  admittance  that  the  pleasure  is  not
worth those costs [16]. Drug abuse affects
the neurotransmitter dopamine, a component
signal of reward, which hastens the devel-
opment of habits, or model-free representa-
tions [17,18]. Regulation of drug craving
involves engaging higher activation in the
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and lower ac-
tivation in the ventral striatum by thinking
of long-term consequences [14]. Effective
therapies  for  rehabilitating  drug  addicts
should focus on reducing the cue-sensitized
reward seeking and modulating the incen-
tive salience of the drug so that normal in-
centives like avoiding jail time or earning
income by maintaining a job can be moti-
vating.
SelF-control and ScHool
Angela Duckworth worked as a teacher
before becoming a Psychology professor at
the University of Pennsylvania, researching
why self-control is necessary for schoolwork
or “how can we make algebra homework into
Angry Birds?” a popular smartphone game.
Schoolwork is deemed equally important toGianessi: Neuroscience of self-control 297
future goals and requires just as much con-
centration for C average and A average stu-
dents [19]. Unfortunately for Duckworth, this
data set also showed that A students do not
rate homework as fun any more than C stu-
dents do, which means they are not turning
homework into Angry Birds. Self-discipline
is a better predictor of grade point average
than intelligence, demonstrating that the abil-
ity to commit to long-term goals is instru-
mental  to  scholastic  success  [20].  It  is
important to start learning self-control early,
since the ability to delay gratification as a
child predicts adaptive long-term develop-
mental outcomes, including better physical
health and personal finances and lower inci-
dence of substance dependence and criminal
records  [21].  Mental  contrasting  is  one
method  used  to  heighten  commitment  to
long-term  goals.  This  technique  involves
imagining the desired future and then con-
trasting it with the present reality and pictur-
ing all that stands in the way of reaching that
future. Thinking about obstacles that could
hamper reaching a goal has been shown to in-
crease achievement when compared to just
thinking positively about the desired future
[22]. Self-control is enhanced through mental
contrasting and forming implementation in-
tention plans to surmount obstacles on the
way to goal attainment.
WHat are tHe etHIcS oF SelF-
control reSearcH?
Matthew Noah Smith contended that
self-regulation research is inherently based
on normative values. What is normal? How
ought we to live? The Yale Philosophy pro-
fessor cautioned that we not over-regulate
ourselves. He gave complementary exam-
ples where one would not want to suppress
expression of emotion, including when a
friend is sick or when one scores a goal
while playing a sport. The definition of self-
control used by the conference ― acting in
a manner consistent with global goals and
values in the face of smaller, more concrete
proximal rewards when these are in conflict
― would undermine these objections, be-
cause in these situations, there is no conflict
between feeling one’s emotions and achiev-
ing one’s long-term goals. Cheering after
scoring a goal need not be regulated, be-
cause that proximal reward does not conflict
with  the  long-term  goal  of  winning  the
game. Feeling sadness and sympathy for a
sick friend is an expectable response to a
particular event. These feelings are not in
line with either proximal or distal rewards,
so self-control is irrelevant to this situation.
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
of Mental Disorders does imply normative
judgments. The definition of a disorder is
any mental condition that causes significant
distress or disability. A diagnosis of disorder
signifies suffering and impairment. This is
only useful when the difference from a norm
used to define the disorder is associated with
suffering. The mental conditions used to di-
agnose a disorder must also not be an ex-
pectable  response  to  a  particular  event.
Empirical study of prevalence, progression,
and prognosis of disorders aids in the devel-
opment of interventions statistically shown
to improve quality of life.
Tamar Gendler, Chair of the Yale Phi-
losophy department, pointed out that goal-
directed behaviors are not always better than
habitual behaviors. Skills that we cultivate
to levels of expertise come with the auto-
maticity of habits. Self-control is often in-
strumental  to  developing  skills  through
practice.  Understanding  which  behaviors
should  be  under  conscious  control  and
which should be well practiced is key to op-
timal decision-making. 
The philosophy panel also warned neu-
roscientists to avoid getting caught up in
mind-body duality, that the soul will not be
localized  to  a  particular  brain  structure.
Though many models presented in the self-
control symposia contained duality ― the
“hot/cool” model by Mischel [23], model-
free versus model-based decision-making
process [3], the dual-motive conflict [1] ―
this is not a mind-body duality. Kentaro Fu-
jita, recently tenured Psychology faculty at
Ohio State University, used Congress as an
elegant metaphor for how the mind works,
where every motivation is represented as a
Senator, who each gets a turn to speak on theGianessi: Neuroscience of self-control 298
floor of the Congress, but eventually, a vote
will decide what the Congress’s action will
be. The goal of self-control is to express
each motivation at the right time and place.
Philosophers voiced that the materialistic
explanation is just one way of knowing.
concluSIon
Self-control can be used to change bad
habits by becoming aware of the habitual be-
havior, increasing commitment to long-term
goals, and imagining solutions to problems
before they occur. Neuroscience studies the
physiology of delayed gratification and finds
that the prefrontal cortex and striatum are in-
volved. Theories of how these brain regions
work in self-control are currently being re-
searched and refined. Good self-control pre-
dicts many adaptive long-term outcomes,
including physical fitness, mental health,
and scholastic achievement. Strategies like
mental contrasting and mindfulness medita-
tion that enhance self-control are useful.
Mindfulness  meditation  practice  can  en-
hance awareness of thought patterns that are
counterproductive to achievement of goals.
Mental contrasting implementation intention
can increase self-control, because one forms
a plan about the future, increasing commit-
ment to distal rather than proximal goals.
Understanding who is capable of controlling
themselves  has  broader  implications  for
many psychiatric disorders, obesity, and the
law. 
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